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Hydrogen: Mechanisms and Strategies of Market Penetration* 
Alan S. Manne and Cesare Marchetti 
1. Introduction and Summary 
This conference provides clear evidence of the growing 
interest in hydrogen as an energy vector and of the increas-
ing variety of efforts to devise water-splitting processes 
based on non-fossil forms of primary energy. The time seems 
appropriate for assessing the economic potential of hydrogen 
in the energy game and for estimating the discounted value 
of this potential. We need quantitative estimates of the 
time lags, probabilities of success, and the costs of R. & 
D. in order to provide guidelines for the allocation of the 
substantial sums of money that will be needed for a success-
ful and timely development program. 
In this paper, we shall describe two successive models--
one for quan t ifying the benefits and the other for optimiz-
ing the level and the structure of the research effort. Our 
aim has been to devise sufficiently simple analyses so as to 
keep intuition on the track. These models require numerical 
values for certain parameters, and in each case we have at-
tempted to work with prudent estimates . Because of the in-
herently subjective nature of these parameters, we have run 
*Paper to be presented at The Hydrogen Economy Miami 
Energy Conference, March 1974. 
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a series of sensitivity analyses. In all cases - -even with 
the most pessimistic assumptions concerning a non-growing, 
slow-learning society--the prospective benefits appear high. 
Compared with these benefits, the costs of exploratory 
research are so low that it would make good sense for the 
U.S. alone to support 50-100 parallel projects during the 
next five years. These would include laboratory and bench-
scale experiments and then unit operations tests. By the 
end of the 1970's, it should be possible to determine which 
projects are the most promising candidates for pilot plant 
construction. Demonstration plants would be built during 
the middle 1980's, and these would be followed by lar ge -
scale commercial facilities during the 1990's. This is the 
scenario for which we shall attempt to estimate the costs 
and benefits. 
2. Hydrogen and the Energy Market 
Most presentations of the ''Hydrogen Economy" emphasize 
the use of hydrogen as an energy vector with superior prop-
erties: clean-burning, cheaply transportable, and readily 
storable. Once we start looking at the size and structur e 
of the energy market, we soon see that it will take many 
years before hydrogen is extensively used as a fuel. From 
the very beginning, however, water-splitt i ng will help to 
economize on fossil resources. The new technology can first 
be used to replace those quantities of oil and natura l gas 
that are now used in the manufacture of chemical hydrogen. 
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This application will come first because it commands a high 
price per BTU and because demands are concentrated in large 
units, e.g. ammonia plants and oil refineries. Concentration 
means that a water-splitting plant could use the output of a 
large high-temperature nuclear reactor. The process heat 
source could be identical to that used for electricity gen-
eration. A large and proved reactor type will provide the 
cheapest source of nuclear process heat. In this way, large 
water-splitting plants could precede the construction of a 
dist ribution net for hydrogen. 
For orientation on the numerical magnitudes, see Table 
1 and Figure 1, reproduced from Meadows and De Carlo [4]. 
Note that there are wide ranges of uncertainty in these long-
term forecasts of hydrogen demand, but that ammonia and 
petroleum refining continue to be the principal customers for 
hydrogen through the year 2000. 
In the following section, our calculation of benefits 
wi ll be extrapolated from the U.S. ttlow adjusted" fi gure of 
15.5 trillion SCF of hydrogen for the year 2000. This is 
15 4 10 BTU, equivalent to 2.3% of that year's ｡ｧｧｲ･ｾ｡ｴ･＠ de-
mand for primary energy (see Associated Univers ities, AET-8 
[l, p.l?]). Despite this small percentage, hydrogen will be 
an enormous industry. Assuming a price of $6 per million 
BTU, the annual sales of hydrogen would amount to $24 billions 
for the U.S . plus an even greater amount for the rest of the 
world. 
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TABLE 1.-Contingency forecasts of demand for hydrogen 
by end use, year 2000 
(Billion standard ·cubic feet) 
Demand in year 2000 
Esti- U.S. 
mated forecast Rest of the 
demand base United Statt=s world' 
End use 1968 2000 
Low High Low High 
Anhydrous 
ammonia 872 3,060 
Petroleum 
2,460 4,490 7,200 12,700 
refining 775 4,580 2,340 32,640 6,000 36,000 
Other uses• 413 1,4'.>0 1,4r,o 24,660 2,000 25,000 
Total .. 2,060 6,250 61,790 15,200 73,700 
Adjusted 
' range l:i.500 52,r,'.lO 24.950 6'.l,950 (Median 34,015) (Median 44,450) 
'Estimated 1968 hydrogen demand in the rest of the world was 
2,99!'> billion rubic feet. 
" Includes hydrogen used in chemicals and allied products, for 
hydrogasification of coal and oil shale, in iron ore reduction, and 
for miscellaneous purposes except plant fuel. 
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Why might it be. reasonable to project a price of $6 per 
million BTU for hydrogen from fossil fuels? With today's 
mature technology for steam reforming, it takes roughly 2 BTU 
of oil or gas primary energy input per BTU of hydrogen output. 
To cover non-fuel operating costs plus a return on capital, 
the price of hydrogen is approximately three times the price 
per GTU of oil or gas. Implicitly, then, we are projecting 
an oil price of $2 per mi llion BTU or $12 per barrel for the 
year 2000 . 
Until water-splitting captures most of the hydrogen mar-
ket, it seems likely that hydrogen p ric es will be determined , 
not by the costs of water- splitting but rather by the costs 
of steam reforming and similar processes tased upon fossil 
fuels. This might put large profits int o the pockets of the 
ｩｮｮｯｶ｡ｴｩｮｾ＠ enterprises-- sufficient profits to more than off-
set their initial teething troubles and R. & D. expenses . 
Once water-splitting has captured the entire market, 
hydrogen prices will be dominated by the evolution of costs 
for this new technolcigy. These costs will be lowered suc-
cessively by economies of scale for individual plants and by 
the cumulative le a rning experience acquired by the water-
spli t ting industry. We shall focus upon the latter component 
because it is more easi ly correlated with the size and dynam-
ics of the market. 
It is convenient to summarize these dynamics with the 
learning parameter A, defined as the percentage reduction in 
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manufacturing costs for every 1% increase in the industry's 
cumulative production. That is, let Q denote the indus-T 
try's output in year T < t. Then the average costs and the 
price in year t+l are given by 
(1) 
The price history of the chemical industry suggests 
that, with a well supported R. & D. program and a fast ex-
panding market, manufacturing costs may be reduced by rough-
ly 20% with every doubling of the cumulative production. 
This would imply that the learning parameter \ = -.3. In the 
following calculations, to be on the conservative side, we 
have supposed that \ = -.2, and that a doubling of the cumu-
lative production will reduce costs by only 13%. This would 
put water-splitting technology in a sleepier league than 
methanol or PVC. This is not very reasonable in view of the 
enormous interest--economic, intellectual and political--
linked to an already launched hydrogen economy. On the other 
side, nuclear reactors and associated chemical plants will be 
affected by the low metabolic rate characteristic of l arge 
animals, and this will tax their rate of evolution. 
In addition to the learning parameter \, equation (1) 
contains a constant of proportionality k . We have estimated 
this parameter OY supposing that a constant amount of new 
capac ity will be added during each of the 10 years preceding 
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year O, the date of capture of the entire chemical hydrogen 
market. The cumulative production during these preceding 
years will therefore be 4.5 times the production in year 0. 
-.2 Hence, k = P0 /(4.5Q0 ) • 
3. The Demand curve for Hydrogen; Market Simulation 
Even before water-splitting captures the entire chemical 
market, hydrogen will begin to be used for steel making and 
for air and road transport. For these applications, hydrogen 
has intrinsic advantages which will more than compensate for 
its high price. In the case of air transportation, this is 
due to hydrogen's high heating value per unit weight. Because 
it increases the productivity of an airplane, hydrogen would 
be preferable to conventional jet fuel even if its price per 
BTU were three times higher. Similarly, hydrogen should com-
mand a premium price per BTU for steel making and for road 
transport in areas where the air is heavily polluted. During 
the 1990's, it is likely that these applications will repre-
sent only a small percentage of the hydrogen market. Nonthe-
less, they will prepare the way for the period of large-scale 
expansion beginning, say, in the year 2000. 
Once water-splitting captures the premium-price chemical 
market, the industry's further expansion will depend upon its 
ability to lower costs and prices. Each time the fabrication 
cost of hytlrogen can be reduced, a new set of customers will 
be attracted. As a shortcut summary of price responsiveness, 
it is convenient to define the elasticity n. This parameter 
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indicates the percentage expansion of the hydrogen market 
associated with each 1% reduction in the current price. For 
the reference case, it has been supposed that the elasticity 
n = -2. This seems like an underestimate of the elasticity 
of demand for hydrogen in view of its small share of the 
energy market and its significant advantages for steel making, 
air and road transport. The demand for hydrogen is surely 
more elastic than that for electricity, a well-established 
energy vector. In the case of electricity, it has been 
estimated that n ｾ＠ -1 (see Doctor and Anderson [2, pp. 37-40]). 
For projecting demands, we shall suppose that future 
growth may be factored into two components: one that is 
dependent upon the hydrogen price and one that is independ-
ent. The first of these effects is summarized through the 
elasticity parameter n, and the second through the growth 
parameter y. The growth parameter allows for those long-term 
trends in hydrogen demand that are related to the growth of 
population, per capita income, per capita use of energy, and 
the rate of learning how to utilize hydrogen in place of con-
ventional fossil fuels. It is supposed that at constant 
prices, the demand for hydrogen would grow at the constant 
annual rate of 5% after the year 2000. This trend factor 
lies well below the above 10% growth rates experienced during 
the 1960's, but recall that this was a period during which 
prices (in constant dollars) declined at the rate of 2.5% per 
year. The trend factor y refers only to the rate at which 
-9-
hydrov.en demand would grow if its price were to remain con-
stant. 
It will be convenient to represent prices and quantities 
as index numbers relative to their values in year O. We may 
then write the market demand curve as 
[quantity l [long-term l [price ] demanded = growth factor elasticity 
in year t at constant factor 
hydrogen prices 
Qt = [ yt ] [ pll t J 
[ l.05t J [ -2 J = pt 
( 2) 
Having specified numerical values for the parameters 
appearing in the dynamic equations (1) and (2), it is straight-
forward to trace the evolution of the hydrogen market over 
time (see Figure 2). It turns out, for example, that P10 = 
.725, and that Q10 = 3.099. Expressed at annual rates, this 
means that prices decline at the rate of 3%, and that demand 
increases at the rate of 12% during the decade beginning in 
1 
2000. These growth rates slow down a bit during subsequent 
years. Intrepidly extrapolating to the year 2050, we note 
that the hydrogen demands would still lie well be low the 
total primary energy demands even if these were to grow at 
the annual rate of only 2.7%. These projections leave ample 
scope for the continuing employment of our colleagues in the 
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electricity industry, but probably not for those in oil, gas, 
and coal. 
4. Evaluation of Benefits 
In itself, this market simulation does not permit us to 
evaluate the benefits of water-splitting. We do so through 
the ''consumers' surplus" measure illustrated in Figure 3 for 
year t = 10. It can be seen that if the hydrogen price re-
mained constant at its initial level P0 = 1, demands would 
grow at the constant rate of only 5%, and that the value 
Qio = 1.0510 = 1.629. We would then observe that the con-
sumers' surplus from water-splitting was zero, for this means 
that the new technology would provide no price reduction to 
consumers. In our basic case, however, there are substantial 
price reductions, and P10 = .725. Accordingly, there are Qio 
consumers each of whom have enjoyed the price reduction of 
(P0 - P10 ). In addition, there are other consumers who have 
been attracted to using hydrogen by the price reduction, but 
who would have been unwilling to pay P0 . Altogether, the con-
s umers' benefits in year 10 are measured by the shaded area 
c10 shown in Figure 3. Similar calculations may be performed 
for each year t = O, 1, 2, ... 50. With an annual discount 
rate of 10% before taxes, the present value of these benefits 
in year 0 is2 
:Year O has been defined here as the date at which water-
spli t ting has captured the entire hydrogen market--roughly the 
year 2000. Recall that this technology will already have been 
incorporated in commercial-scale plants during the entire pre-
ceeding decade. In evaluating the present value of the bene-
fi ts i n equation (3) , we have taken no credit for consumers' 
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( 3) 
According to Table 2, the benefits index B20 = 4.319. 
To convert this into the dollar value of benefits in the 
year 2000, we must recall that P0 corresponds to $6 per 
million BTU, that Q0 = 4 10
15 BTU, and that P0 Q0 = $24 bil-
lions. Accordingly, the value of water-splitting discounted 
to the year 2000 is ($24 billions)(4.319) ｾ＠ $100 billions. 
Dis counting to 1975 at the annual rate of 10%, the present 
value of consumers' benefits from water-splitting would be 
of the order of $10 billions. 
For those who wish to test the effects of other numer-
ical parameter values, we have run a series of progressively 
more pessimistic calculations than the basic case. For ex-
ample, if consumers are "unresponsive" to the price of hydro-
gen, the elasticity n = -1.5. This would reduce the dis-
counted benefit index B20 by a relatively small amount--from 
4.319 to 3.685. With slow learning (the "low I.Q." column 
with A = -.1), there would be a slow rate of price decline, 
and the benefits index B20 = 1.743. With a "no growth" so-
ciety, y = 1.00, and the benefits B20 = 2.026. Combining 
these pessimistic assumptions, we arrive at the rightmost 
column , a "living fossil" society. Even in this case the 
benefits index would be .819 ($24 billions) ｾ＠ $20 billions 
discounted to the year 2000 ｾ＠ $1.8 billions discounted to 
1975. 
fiiO.le t: • .c.11et:i.,::; u1 au et:u11u111.Lt:a.l.LY t:umpei:;.Li.,.Lve wai.,er-::ip.ll.1:.1:.l.ng prucess 
ｾ ･＠ identification number 
demand elasticity 
learning parameter 
hydrogen demand 
growth factor, annual, 
at constant hydrogen 
prices 
, price index, year 2010 
, quantity index, year 2010 
, benefits index, dis-
counted through 2010 
, benefits index, dis-
counted through 2020 
, benefits index, dis-
counted through 2030 
,dollar value of benefits 
discounted to 1975 
( $ bi llions) 
! Basic 
! case 
1 
-2.0 
- • 2 
1.05 
.725 
3.099 
1.550 
4.319 
7.208 
9.6 
' 
Pessimistic assumptions 
"unresponsive" "low I.Q." 
2 3 
I -1.5 j -2.0 
- • 2 I- .11 
1.05 1.05 
.737 .865 
2.575 2.179 
1.408 .679 
3.685 1. 743 
5.868 2.742 
8.2 3.9 
"no growth" 
4 
-2.0 
- . 2 
I i.ooj 
.758 
1. 741 
1.016 
2.026 
2.589 
4. s 
Most pessimistic 
case 
"living fossil" 
5 
ｾ＠
E!l 
1 i.001 
.883 
1.205 
.438 
.819 
1.014 
i. 0 
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5. A One-time Decision Model for R. & D. Expenditures 
Now that we have made a rough estimate of the potential 
benefits, we may formulate a model for optimizing the level 
of research and development expenditures on water-splitting. 
Given the magnitude of the benefits, there is reason to be-
lieve that it pays to investigate several technologies in 
parallel--electrolytic, thermochemical, and direct thermal 
dissociation. The primary energy source is likely to be 
nuclear fission, but it could also be solar, geothermal, or 
fusion. There are a large number of possible ways to split 
the water molecule. For example, 16 thermochemical cycles 
have been identified at just one laboratory, the Ispra Joint 
Nuclear Research Centre (see EUR 5059e [3, p. 13]). Many 
additional cycles have been proposed, and are being discus-
sed at other sessions of this conference. 
Now suppose that for investigating just one water-split-
ting technology, it requires 5 years for laboratory and 
bench-scale experiments and for unit operation tests. Alto-
gether, the present value of the costs for one exploratory 
investigation will be, say, $10 millions. It will be con-
venient to express these costs as a fraction of the potent-
ial benefit s. Accordingly, if the present value of the 
potential benefits is $10 billions, the ratio of costs to 
gross benefits for a single "experiment" would be c = .001. 
Each of these individual investigations would be risky, 
and there is no assurance of success on any one attempt. 
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By taking a sufficiently large number of such gambles, how-
ever, there is a high probability that at least one will be 
a winner. A "success" might be defined as a water-splitting 
process for which a commercial-scale plant would be capable 
of producing hydrogen at a cost of $6 per million BTU, in-
cluding a return on capital. This would then be competitive 
with hydrogen from steam reforming during the 1990's when 
oil prices might be $12 per barrel (at today's general price 
level). 
For simplicity, it is supposed that each line of water-
splitting research has an identical and independently dis-
tributed probability of success. Let p denote the probabi-
lity of failure. For example, if the probabilities of suc-
cess are only 1 in 20, the failure probability p = .95. 
Then the expected benefits minus the costs of a single in-
vestigation will be 
($10 billions)(l - p - c) = ($10 billions)(l - .95 - .001) 
= $490 millions. 
From the viewpoint of the U.S. economy as a whole, it 
can be seen that this would be a highly favorable gamble. It 
can also be seen that there are diminishing returns from 
parallel R. & D. efforts--especially if we make the fairly 
realistic assumption that there are no additional benefits 
from developing ｾ＠ than one successful water-splitting 
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process. To analyze this quantitatively, let x denote the 
number of parallel investigations. It will be convenient to 
choose the unit of benefits and costs as 1.0 rather than $10 
billions. Then a one-time decision model for optimizing the 
level of R. & D. expenditures would be the following uncon-
strained maximization problem: 
[expected 3 ] ｾ｡ｹｯｦｦ＠ from] f robabili ty oj ｾ･ｳ･｡ｲ｣ｨ＠ anJ net benefits = one or more one or more - development 
successes successes costs for x 
parallel in-
vestigations 
f(x) : [ 1 J [1 - PX] [ex l 
If x is sufficiently large so that we can work with 
first derivatives rather than first differences, the optimal 
number of investigations may be calculated by setting f'(x) = O. 
Therefore 
f I ( X) : (-log p)px - c : 0 
. optimal x : log[c/-log p] ( 5) .. 
log p 
The implications of equation (5) are shown on Figure 4. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the higher the probability of failure, 
the greater becomes the optimal number of experiments to be 
3
one extension of tnis basic model is being investigated 
by Jean-Pierre Ponssard at IIASA. Working with an exponent-
ial "utility" function, he has shown that for decision makers 
who are averse to taking risks, the optimal number of inves-
tigations is generally larger than for the expected value 
criterion adopted here. 
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undertaken in parallel. For example, suppose that there is 
a $10 billion payoff from water-splitting, a $10 million 
cost of each experiment, and therefore c = .001. If the prob-
ability of failure is .5, it is optimal to undertake only 9 
experiments. With the less favorable situation in which 
p = .99, the optimal number becomes 230! Needless to say, 
this monotone increasing relation cannot be extrapolated in-
definitely. It is no longer valid for an unfavorable lottery 
--that is, for c > 1 - p. Hence x = 0 for c = .01 and p > .99. 
Some additional insights may be obtained from Figure 5. 
This shows the expected net benefit function f(x) for 3 al-
ternative values of the failure probability p--keeping the 
cost of experiments fixed at c = .001 . The maximum point 
along each of the 3 curves is indicated by an arrow. It can 
be seen that these 3 optimal values of x are identical with 
those on Figure 4. 
Figure 5 suggests that if we are uncertain about the 
value of p, there would be no more than a 20% loss in 
optimality if we set x = 100. This number of experiments 
would be "robust" for values of p ranging between the ex-
tremes of . 90 and ,99, With 100 experiments and with p = ,95, 
the probability of discovering one or more successful pro-
cesses would then be 1 - .95lOO = ,994. 
6. A Sequential Decision Model 
Now consider the case of sequential decisions, but con-
tinue to suppose that the experimental outcomes do not lead 
1. 000 
.900 
.eoo 
.700 
.600 
. • 500 
expected discounted net benefit from x 
paralle l exper iments, f(x) ; expressed as 
f raction of $10 billions 
failure ｰｲｯ｢｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹｾ＠ p=.99 
. 400 , f 
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us to revise our prior estimates of the probability parameter 
p ("Bygones are bygones."). Today (at time O), we select x, 
the number of processes to be investigated during the initial 
experimental period of, say, 5 years. At the end of this 
period for bench-scale and unit operations experiments, we 
learn whether all of these attempts have been failures. If 
so, there is another opportunity to enter this same type of 
lottery. If x was an optimal number for the first set of 
experiments, it will again be optimal for the second set. 
Similarly, at the end of 10 years--even if all of the pre-
ceding experiments were failures--it remains optimal to in-
vestigate x more technologies during the third set of ex-
periments. And so on ad infinitum.4 
This sequential decision process yields a higher value 
of expected discounted net benefits than f(x) in equation (4). 
To see this, let 8 denote the discount factor for each five-
year period of experimentation. (For example, if the annual 
discount rate is 10%, 8 = (1/1.1) 5 = .62.) Let ｾＨｸＩ＠ denote 
the expected discounted net benefits from undertaking x 
projects at each five-year interval--assuming that all prev-
ious experiments have ended in failures. It can then be seen 
4 This sequential decision model has an inherent weakness. 
There is a small but positive probability that even after a 
long series of unsuccessful experiments, we will not discon-
tinue the search for water-splitting processes. This logical 
difficulty may, of course, be overcome by introducing Bayesian 
revision of the prior probability parameter p. 
that 
[
expected net ] 
｢･ｮ･ｦｾｴｳ＠ from 
one five-year 
period of 
experiments 
:.g(x) ;: 
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[
discounted sum of ] 
probabilities for 
each ｰｯｳｾｩ｢ｬ･＠ five-
year period of 
experiments 
( 6) 
Figure 6 contains the numerical results for the sequen-
tial decision equation (6). As in Figure 5, the cost per 
experiment c = .001. Again, the net benefit curve is shown 
fo r three alternative values of the probability parameter: 
p = .90, .95 and .99. It will be seen that the maximum 
value of g(x) is in each case slightly higher than the cor-
responding value of f(x), and that the optimal value of x 
is smaller--e.g., for p = .95, the maximum values of f(x) 
and g(x) are, respectively, .904 and .920 (expressed as 
fractions of the $10 bill i on benefits). The maximizing 
values of x are 75 and 60 experiments. 
For the sequential as well as the one-time model, it 
r emains a robust decision to set the number of initial par-
allel experiments x = 100. This numerical result makes 
good common sense. Given an opportunity to enter a favorable 
lottery, we cannot go far wrong if the size of the initial 
gamble is 10% of the ultimate prize. If these numbers are 
expected discounted net benefits from x 
parallel experiments, g(x); ··expressed as 
1.000 1 fraction of $10 billions · 
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at all realistic, it would not be difficult to justify the 
expenditure of $1 billions in the search for economically 
competitive water-splitting processes. 
[l] 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
-25-
References 
Associated Universities, AET-8, Reference Energy 
Systems and Resource Data for Use in the 
Assessment of Energy Technologies. Upton, 
New York, April 1972, p. 15. 
Doctor, R.D., Anderson, K.P. et al., "California's 
Electricity Quandary: III, Slowing the Growth 
Rate," R-1116-NSF/CSA. RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, California, September 1972. 
ISPRA Joint Nuclear Research Centre, Progress 
Report No. 3, EUR 5059 e, 1973. 
Meadows, P., and Decarlo, J.A., "Hydrogen," in 
Mineral Facts and ｆｩｾｵｲ･ｳＬ＠ U.S. Bureau of 
Mines, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 1970. 

